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rAbstract
Using the Russian Longitudinal Monitoring Survey data, the paper examines Russian
workers’ fear of unemployment under different economic and labor market
conditions during the last 15 years. We employ two alternative measures for this fear.
The first one looks at the workers’ fear of losing their current jobs, while the second
deals with the fear of not finding relevant re-employment in case of displacement. In
order to get the best possible measurement of unemployment for those local and
social environments where our respondents live and work, we design
unemployment rates for narrowly defined regional and demographic (peer) groups.
Estimating ordered probit models for both fear measures, and controlling for various
worker and job characteristics, we do not find significant causal effects of
unemployment on these fears in most of our specifications. These results are robust
to exclusion of potentially endogenous variables; they hold for different periods,
subsamples, and levels of job security. Moreover, our simulations show that even a
large increase in the unemployment rate has little impact on conditional
probabilities of expressing a strong or weak fear of unemployment. These results
suggest that the high level and persistence of fear of unemployment in Russia may
be caused by non-economic factors.
Jel codes: I21, J12, J620
Keywords: Fear of unemployment, Job insecurity, Russia
“There are other structures that operate, to a large degree, independently of the
reasoning process. And when fear is activated, it is very difficult to turn off.”
Al Gore, The Politics of Fear, 2004.1
1. Introduction
Economists are interested not only in actual dynamics, factors, and consequences of un-
employment, but in subjective perceptions and expectations of unemployment as well.
Fear of unemployment is one such perception and it affects human behavior. Fear of un-
employment may decrease wages (Blanchflower, 1991; Aaronson and Sullivan, 1998;
Campbell et al., 2007; Blanchflower and Shadforth, 2007), contain consumption (Stephens,
2004; Benito, 2006), negatively affect health (Burgard et al., 2009), suppress subjective well-
being, and complicate family relations (Burchell, 1994), among other things.
The distribution of unemployment fear across the population is also of high import-
ance. First, workers’ subjective perceptions of unemployment (as well as objective data2012 Gimpelson and Oshchepkov; licensee Springer. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative
ommons Attribution License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and
eproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.
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ered as indicators for the efficiency of the existing social and employment protections
(e.g., OECD, 1997; Manski and Straub, 2000; Clark and Postel-Vinay, 2009). Second,
workers’ fear of unemployment can be a measure of likelihood of future unemploy-
ment. As we know, expectations are likely to affect future behaviour. Third, politicians
often use various fears as a convenient tool for political manipulation.2 Widespread fear
of unemployment can induce politicians to support more rigid employment protection
legislation (EPL). In its turn, more rigid EPL is likely to suppress job creation in the
formal sector and to expand informal sector employment. These outcomes feed fears,
creating a vicious circle that is hard to disrupt (Clark and Postel-Vinay, 2009). Fourthly,
the fear may serve various particularistic interests as well. By heightening fears of un-
employment among the population and falsifying inflated forecasts to this end, a Labor
Ministry responsible for employment programs and support of the unemployed can get
additional funds from the state coffers. Large enterprises can exploit this fear in order
to lobby for subsidies from the government and pressure workers for wage
concessions.3
These results motivate research in factors that may drive these fears. As multiple
studies on this issue show, fear of unemployment varies across social and demographic
groups (e.g., Manski and Straub, 2000; Elman and O’Rand, 2002). In general, more
competitive workers and employees in better-protected jobs tend to express less fear of
unemployment. The quality of institutional environment where firms and workers
operate matters as well. However, trends in actual unemployment remain the most
natural cause of this fearfulness, and many studies confirm this hypothesis. The fear of
unemployment moves in line with actual unemployment, and even small changes in
unemployment are translated into significant changes in the level of fear (e.g., Schmidt,
1999; Green et al., 2000; Campbell et al., 2007).
This paper considers the case of Russia, where the link between actual unemployment
and individual fearfulness can be weak or seriously muted. On the one hand, economic
development over the last 20 years was extremely bumpy, with large swings in the GDP
growth followed by increases (or decreases, correspondingly) in the unemployment rate.
On the other hand, as available survey evidence suggests, workers’ subjective perceptions
of job instability were highly inertial and showed little reaction to actual trends.
The fear of unemployment among Russian workers and its tentative determinants
were explored earlier in Gimpelson et al. (2003) and Linz and Semykina (2008). Find-
ings from these two papers note some anomalies that mark the Russian labor market in
comparison to the labor markets in more advanced economies. For example, in Russia
this fear is not gender neutral (women are more fearful in this respect than men are)
and it increases over age and tenure (in most countries, job tenure tends to reduce
fears). As to the relationship between actual labor market conditions and unemploy-
ment fear, the authors of both papers conclude that it did not appear early in the
transition but became statistically significant later on. However, these papers did not
consider the period after 2004, when fears remained high despite rapid economic
growth and further unemployment decline.
In this paper, using the Russian Longitudinal Monitoring Survey data, we study the
association between actual unemployment and fear of unemployment in the period
from 1994 to 2009. This period includes the years of steep transformational recession
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crisis (2008-2009). We employ two alternative measures for this fear. The first measure
looks at the fear of losing one’s current job, while the second deals with the fear of not
finding relevant re-employment in case of displacement. Our methodology is based on
estimating an ordered probit model, where fearfulness is regressed on actual unemploy-
ment rates with controls for individual and job characteristics. Besides the standard
regional unemployment rates, we use unemployment rates for local peer groups that
are based on estimates from the Russian Labor Force Survey. These indicators are bet-
ter proxies of labor market-related risks for particular workers and have larger
variance.
The key finding of our study is that unemployment-related fearfulness of workers is
weakly linked to the actual unemployment rate. These results are robust to exclusion
of potentially endogenous variables; they hold for different periods, subsamples and
regardless of variation in levels of jobs security. Even if an association exists, the
practical impact of unemployment on perceptions is subtle. As simulations show,
drastically large fluctuations in unemployment add practically little to intensity of fears.
These results allow suggest that the high level and persistence of fear of unemployment
in Russia may be caused by non-economic factors.
The next section presents the story of the Russian labor market over the period of
2000-09 and how it is reflected in subjective perceptions. Section 3 explains our
research methodology and empirical data. A descriptive analysis of the fear-related vari-
ables is provided in Section 4. Sections 5 and 6 discuss findings from the econometric
analysis. In the conclusion, we sum up our major findings and outline further research
efforts.
2. Labor market trends and institutional change: could they affect fear
of unemployment?
2.1. Main trends
Soon after the financial crisis of 1998, the unemployment rate reached a record
high of 14.6%. However, in early 1999 it started to decline rapidly, thus reacting to
the economy’s return onto a path of growth. The unemployment rate declined dur-
ing the whole period between 2000 and 2007 and was less than 6% by mid-2008.
The proportion of those who lost their jobs due to lay-offs, dismissals, and bank-
ruptcy among all unemployed persons decreased from 26% in 2000 to under 19%
in 2008.4
Meanwhile, the economic recovery affected all other labor market indicators as well.
The employment to population (e/p) ratio increased by 5 pp, previously accumulated
wage arrears decreased, the incidence of underemployment decreased, and the number
of annual hours worked increased. The problem of excess employment, which was
typical for many firms in the 1990s, was replaced by its opposite – the widely publi-
cized “threat of total labor shortage”.5 Hiring rates stayed high and were positively
correlated with vacancy rates. But the most impressive labor market development was
presented by the real wage growth, which, according to the Russian Statistical Service
(Rosstat), was an annual 12-15% over the whole period. As a result, by 2008 the Russian
labor market looked completely differently than in 1999 or 2000. These developments
should have weakened a potential fear of unemployment.
Gimpelson and Oshchepkov IZA Journal of Labor & Development 2012, 1:6 Page 4 of 26
http://www.izajold.com/content/1/1/6Of course, a more detailed look could paint a less optimistic picture. The number of
those employed in the corporate sector (and thus formally exposed to the EPL protection)
decreased from 52 million workers to about 48 million or by 7-8 pp. The proportion of
workers in volatile jobs – temporary or casual – increased, as did the informal sector em-
ployment. In other words, the proportion of workers in various “bad” jobs rose continu-
ously (Lehmann et al., 2011). Many workers had their own first-hand experience of
volatile employment and this could implicitly feed feelings of insecurity and anxiety. How-
ever, persistently high hiring rates meant that losing an insecure job was quite easily com-
pensated by finding a new one similar to the former position.
The economic crisis of 2008-09 strongly affected the labor market, but its measurable
toll emerged with a lag. Despite multiple layoff announcements, there was little down-
sizing in 2008. The unemployment rate in q4 2008 was a modest 7%, but this was 1.3
pp higher than 1 year earlier. In 2009, the unemployment rate reached 8.5% and all
other labor market indicators began to change as well: rapid real wage growth turned
to slightly negative growth, wage arrears (though quite modest) reappeared, and under-
employment was on the rise again (Gimpelson and Kapeliushnikov, 2011). The expect-
ation of mass dismissals in large firms became a new focus of media attention and a
factor of growing public concern. Nevertheless, this grim period was rather short and
all indicators soon (in 2010) improved, signaling that the major threat had passed by.
Summing up, most of the actual labor market trends over this period should have
cushioned fears, though some developments could have an ambiguous impact on sub-
jective perceptions. Objective causes for more fearfulness emerged by the end of the
period under study. This balance could, of course, vary across social and demographic
groups of employees.
2.2. Institutional changes
Major labor market institutions were largely shaped in the early 1990s and with some modi-
fications survived throughout the 2000s. The Russian authorities have never considered this
policy area an explicit priority. Their implicit goal in the institution building was to prevent
mass downsizing of the labor force which was considered a threat to political stability. In
the 1990s, both the minimum wage and the UB replacement ratio remained low, and the
variable part of the labor compensation became tied to the economic performance of firms.
This framework provided wages with high flexibility and accommodated strong external
shocks through price adjustment (OECD, 2011; Gimpelson and Kapeliushnikov, 2011).
Meanwhile, the EPL, materialized in the slightly adjusted old Soviet Labor Code, remained
quite rigid though weakly enforced.6 High wage dispersion fostered quitting and very buoy-
ant labor turnover in general. Rare lay-offs were of no surprise in such a setting.
Institutional changes in the Russian labor market that took place in the 2000s could
hardly strengthen any feelings of insecurity. The new Labor Code enacted in 2001 did
not affect the core of major protective regulations, while the government tried to
improve enforcement of labor contracts and labor regulations. These changes, if gauged
formally, were aimed at providing more job protection to workers and should cushion
potential fears.
Quantitative indicators reflecting the actual functioning of institutions may draw a
different picture. The actual EPL coverage of workers tended to shrink (with the de-
cline in the proportion of workers in firms where EPL was potentially enforceable) from
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fraction of unprotected workers. Doubling the minimum wage annually in 2006-09
accelerated the wage growth in the lower part of the wage distribution, thus increasing
the economic value of low paid corporate jobs. Multiple wage increases in the public
sector during the second half of the 2000s worked in the same way. The increase in
wages and stronger wage compression in the left tail of the distribution could simulta-
neously eject low productive workers out of jobs. Since the rapid average wage growth
was associated with a decrease in the UB replacement ratio8, the total costs of un-
employment to workers tended to rise.
This part of the story suggests that institutional changes were not clear-cut from the
point of their impact on subjective insecurity.
2.3. Level and dynamics of unemployment fears
Now we turn to the fears themselves. Figure 1 presents the evolution of the two
RLMS-based indicators for subjective perceptions of insecurity in the Russian labor
market during 1994-2009. Both indicators are scaled in percents to their levels in
1994. The first reflects the proportion of those who fear losing their job (the pro-
portion of workers who said they were very concerned or concerned with potential
job loss) and the second one shows the proportion of those who fear not finding a
new job of comparable quality (the proportion of workers who said they were ab-
solutely unsure or somewhat unsure they would find a job of comparable quality if
they were fired).9
As Figure 1 suggests, throughout the 2000s the subjective insecurity in Russia was
quite inertial. It stayed high compared to other countries (Figure 2 and Figure 3). The
proportion of those who feared losing their jobs was persistently above 50% (and the
proportion of those who feared not finding a new one exceeded 40% except 2007). To
compare: in the 1990s, in the USA and the UK, the proportion of workers who feared
losing their jobs was under 10% (e.g., Aaronson and Sullivan, 1998; Campbell et al.
2007). This fits the general cross-country picture showing that the level of fear among
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Figure 2 The index of the fear of losing a job in different countries in 1997 and in 2005
(1-min; 4-max).
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clearly contrasts to the much more liberal regulations in the US or the UK.10 Russians’
fear of losing their jobs is similar to workers in Latin America (Figure 3) where the
rigid EPL only covers the relatively small formal sector and modern unemployment
protection is almost non-existent (Graham, 2002).
The positive association between the stringency of job protection and the level of fear
that we observe may seem counterintuitive. However, strong fear of unemployment
(regardless of its origin) can boost demand for stricter EPL. Stricter EPL, if delivered by
politicians, in turn suppresses job creation and increases pressure on workers in times
of crisis. The latter may have a further impact on subjective insecurity thus closing the
circle (Wasmer, 2006). 11
Another interesting observation is that the subjective perceptions of Russian workers
seem to be inertial and only somewhat sensitive to the actual state of the labor market.
The dotted line in Figure 1 reflects the actual unemployment dynamics. Despite the
fact that the unemployment rate was halved between 1998 and 2007, the proportion of
workers fearful of losing their job only declined from 69% to 53%. The proportion of
those who feared not finding a job in this period declined more, but it stayed steadily
above 40% except in 2007. The period after 2004 when the indicators of fear continued
to stay high despite a rapid decline in actual unemployment was not considered in the
previous studies (Linz and Semykina, 2008; Gimpelson et al., 2003). A slight upward
turn in both indicators emerged in late 2008, when the economy started to slide into
the new crisis. In 2009, the unemployment rate increased by 2 pp, causing little
response in indicators of fear.
Stability in the average levels of unemployment fear reflects strong inertia in individ-
ual perceptions. About 40% of workers did not move along fear scales, even during
dramatic macroeconomic events and labor market changes associated with the crises of
1998 and 2008-09. Around 70% of workers who feared losing their job in the year t still









































































































Figure 3 The index of the fear of unemployment in Russia and Latin American countries.
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unemployment. Workers’ perceptions concerning finding a new job after being fired
were even more stable over time. This provides additional evidence that subjective per-
ception of job security seems to be inertial and somewhat sheltered from external ob-
jective circumstances.
The discussion presented above brings us to our main hypothesis that subjective
perceptions of unemployment in Russia are not caused by actual labor market deve-
lopments. In the following paragraphs we will test this proposition and discuss poten-
tial implications.
3. Methodology and data
Our study uses microdata from the Russian Longitudinal Monitoring Survey (RLMS).
The RLMS is the only representative household survey in Russia containing a wide set
of questions on labor activity, including questions about unemployment-related fears.
We exploit the pooled data set containing all waves from 1994 to 2009.
The empirical strategy is based on estimation of the following equation:
Fearit ¼ β0 þ β1U jt þ β2Du þ β3ICit þ β4JCit þ τt þ εit ð1Þ
The LHS variable (Fearit) can be measured using two different survey questions(see below). We are interested in a causal effect between this variable and the actual
unemployment rate (U). Index i stands for individual, j for region (or specific peer
group), for which unemployment is measured, and t for year. We control for individual
characteristics of workers (IC), job characteristics (JC), and individual unemployment
experience (Du). Fixed time effect τ captures the effect of time-related factors affecting
all workers simultaneously.12
The level of fear in the RLMS is measured in the following ways. The first question
is: «To what extent are you concerned that you may lose your job?» (FEAR_1).
The second question is: «Imagine an unpleasant outcome: the firm or organization
you work for is going to be closed and all workers will be fired. To what extent are sure
you will able to find a new job which is not worse that the current one?» (FEAR_2).
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how respondents evaluate the likelihood of losing their current job, while the second
measures the likelihood of finding new employment of comparable quality and related
financial and emotional costs. Each question allows for five alternative answers ordered
from 1 (the lowest level of fear) to 5 (the highest level).13 We estimate the model (1)
using the ordered probit technique taking into account clustering of errors across indi-
viduals. We do all estimations separately for both questions since they differ in nuance.
As shown above, in the 1990s, the indexes based on these questions moved almost
identically. In the second half of the 2000s, they started to diverge and for older
workers, this was especially the case.
Both questions are asked in all RLMS waves and have already been used to study
subjective insecurity in Russia.14 The wording of the questions is similar to those used in
other countries. The difference is that such questions often have references to a particular
period of time, e.g. one year. (See, e.g., Dominitz and Manski, 1996; Fullerton and Wallace,
2007; Schmidt, 1999; Manski and Straub 2000; Clark and Postel-Vinay, 2009).
For controlling actual labor market situation (Ujt), we alternatively exploit three
different variables. The most straightforward approach is to use standard (the ILO type)
unemployment rates calculated for each region included in the survey sample. They are
widely used in the literature, including two mentioned papers on Russia (Gimpelson
et al., 2003; Linz and Semykina, 2008). However, such regional variables have a number
of obvious disadvantages. They are too aggregated and therefore may poorly reflect
actual labor market related risks for different social and demographic groups living in
large and heterogeneous regions. One could expect that the individual fears we are
interested in may reflect risks existing for individuals with characteristics similar to our
respondents. For example, a 40-year-old man with higher education residing in Voronezh
city would consider the labor market situation as it emerges in this city for individuals
with observable characteristics similar to his. This discrepancy may result in measurement
error for our key regressor leading to the attenuation bias.15
In order to overcome the shortcomings of aggregated regional unemployment rates,
we calculate group-specific unemployment and non-employment rates. For doing this
using LFS micro-data, we form multiple groups as simultaneous breakdowns by
region*urban/rural*gender*education variables. Altogether we get 496 specific groups.
For each group and for each year (in the RLMS survey), we calculated unemployment
rate (as % of unemployed in economically active population in the group) and non-
employment rate (as % of non-employed in the total population in the group).16 We
can do this because the LFS sample is much larger than the RLMS sample. Then we
impute these values to every respondent in our RLMS sample and use these group-
specific labor market indicators in our base specifications. They have much larger vari-
ation than standard regional unemployment rates have and are less subject to the
measurement error problem.
We measure former unemployment experience using two dummy variables. The first
equals 1 if our respondent was unemployed at least once over the survey period, and to
0 otherwise. The second equals 1 if a respondent was unemployed in the previous wave
and to 0 otherwise.17
We control for individual characteristics (gender, age and age squared, education,
marital status, occupation, getting a pension, tenure and tenure squared, having a
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nates, having wage arrears). The macro-region where our respondents reside is also
controlled.
If the first group of variables (individual characteristics) reflects the bargaining power
of individuals on the labor market, the second one (job characteristics) measures risks
associated with the quality of these jobs. One could assume that fear of job loss tends
to be lower for employees working in the public sector than in the private sector, lower
for workers at large enterprises than at small ones, and lower for those working for-
mally than those informally.18
The extent to what workers fear losing their jobs can be affected not just by the likeli-
hood of losing their job, but also by the costs associated with the loss for a worker. For
example, these costs may be lower if a worker has alternative income sources (a second
job or a pension).
The descriptive statistics for all repressors used in the paper is presented in Table 1.
We restrict the sample to individuals who were between the ages of 15 and 72 in the
year of observation. Two sub-periods considered in the paper (1994-1998 and 2000-
2008) reveal some important differences. In the second sub-period, the proportion of
employed by the state kept declining, but the unemployment rate and the incidence of
wage arrears went down quickly.
4. Descriptive analysis of fear
Table 2 presents descriptive statistics for FEAR_1 and FEAR_2 across major groups of
workers.Table 1 Descriptive statistics
1994-1998 2000-2009
Variable Mean Min Max Mean Min Max
Female (1-yes; 0-no) 0.49 0 1 0.51 0 1
Age (years) 39.16 15 72 38.85 15 72
Receiving pension (1-yes; 0-no) 0.12 0 1 0.13 0 1
Education level (1 – below secondary;
2 –secondary; 3 – vocational; 4 –tertiary)
3.00 1 4 3.10 1 4
Tenure (years) 7.94 0 56 7.09 0 58
Married (1-yes; 0-no) 0.75 0 1 0.71 0 1
State ownership (1-yes; 0-no) 0.67 0 1 0.47 0 1
Having subordinates (1-yes; 0-no) 0.23 0 1 0.22 0 1
Having second job (1-yes; 0-no) 0.05 0 1 0.05 0 1
Having wage arrears (1-yes; 0-no) 0.51 0 1 0.14 0 1
Living in a rural settlement (1-yes, 0- no) 0.28 0 1 0.29 0 1
Living in Moscow or St. Petersburg (1-yes; 0-no) 0.10 0 1 0.13 0 1
Unemployment experience (1-yes, 0-no) 0.05 0 1 0.13 0 1
Unemployed in previous year (1-yes, 0-no) 0.03 0 1 0.03 0 1
The level of regional unemployment (%) 10.10 4.8 23.9 7.61 0.8 25.7
The level of specific unemployment (%) 11.94 0.88 54.12 10.96 0.11 60.02
The level of specific non-employment (%) 49.5 2.27 92.84 55.42 1.55 93.89
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Fear of unemployment varies by gender and age groups. FEAR_1 is inversely U-shaped
over age. The strongest fear was in the age group of 46-59 years old. Here, 63% of
workers in the first sub-period and 55% in the second one feared losing their jobs. For
workers over 59 years old, these proportions were smaller by 13 and 10 pp. This corre-
sponds with the fact that unemployment-related risks seem to be the highest for the
pre-pension age but then with age they go down due to the appearance of alternative
(pension) income. The proportion of those fearful of job loss in the 30-45 age group
decreased by 12 pp between the two sub-periods, and this decrease was largest among
all age groups.
On the contrary, fear of not finding a job (FEAR_2) changes monotonically with age
and reaches the maximum in the pension age group. The decrease in this fear over
time (between the sub-periods) was largest (by 20 pp) for the youngest age group and
smallest (by 8 pp) for the oldest.
Women compared to men are more afraid of losing job but the gender gap is lower
in the second sub-period. The same is true in case of fears associated with job search.
Increased educational levels weaken fears and reduce between-group differences. In
the 1990s, higher education was associated with significantly lower fears, but this differ-
ence largely evaporated in the 2000. Those respondents who have families tend to have
stronger fear than those without, though the difference is of low significance.
Rural residents report greater fear than urban residents: among the latter, residents of
Moscow and Saint Petersburg are least likely to report unemployment fear. These dif-
ferences in perceptions may reflect differences in access to jobs as well as differences in
human capital endowments.
Having a second job that can indirectly mirror labor market competiveness (through
alternative or complementary professional skills) expectedly weakens fears. In case of
job loss, the availability of alternative income decreases the costs of temporary jobless-
ness and of the job search. On the contrary, wage arrears, if they exist, reflect both a
worker’s low market power and job volatility.4.2. Job characteristics
One could expect that occupying a better-protected job would reduce anxiety
about its potential loss. However, the data do not suggest that better protected
jobs (located in the public sector, in large firms, and with fully formal labor
contracts) are associated with weaker fears.
State sector workers are more prone to stronger fears than workers in the private sector
are. These differences are even more pronounced in the case of job search (var. FEAR_2).
As an employer, the state is expected to provide more secure jobs, and workers are
expected to feel this security. Even more counterintuitive is the evidence that informal
workers (those without a formal contract) seem to have a weaker fear of job loss. In the
2000s, in this group both variables of fear had the lowest values among all groups that are
presented in Table 2. The level of fear shows little variation by firm size: workers at large
firms perceive job insecurity as much as workers at small firms do.
Having subordinates correlates with lower anxiety. On the one hand, this factor
reflects a worker’s hierarchical status; on the other, more energetic and able workers
Table 2 Percentages of workers who fear of losing their jobs and not finding a new one
(percentage of workers choosing values “4” or “5” when answering the fear questions),
by subgroups of workers, RLMS, 1994-1998 and 2000-2009
Fear of losing Fear of not finding
1994-1998 2000-2009 1994-1998 2000-2009
Age 15-29 55.04 47.47 51.4 31.1
30-45 64.8 55.15 63.15 42.05
46-59 65.12 58.46 70.95 59.13
60-72 49.69 46.86 73.66 66.49
Gender Female 58.06 55.05 70.93 49.84
Male 65.28 51.72 54.09 39.29
Education level Lower than
secondary
64.93 54.28 71.09 49.68
Secondary 63.39 53.84 64.86 46.12
Vocational 64.57 54.54 63.31 42.16
Tertiary 58.76 52.72 59.52 45.18
Married Yes 62.06 54.11 62.97 45.61
No 60.65 51.88 62.01 43.21
State ownership Yes 62.08 53.67 64.6 48.82
No 60.35 54.04 58.11 41.51
Firm size < 51 employees 61.48 52.57 62.78 43.84
51-100 60.26 52.72 61.27 42.97
101-200 62.69 52.57 64.44 45.67
201-1000 60.68 56.07 64.08 48.32
>1000 employees 62.54 54.97 63.55 44.53
Informal employment Yes 55.81 44.88 54.12 27.95
No 69.29 54.73 68.48 45.7
Having subordinates Yes 57.04 50.65 56.19 42.03
No 63.13 54.28 64.75 45.78
Having second job Yes 44.91 41.87 41.64 30.4
No 62.53 54.06 63.78 45.7
Having wage arrears Yes 65.23 54.75 67.68 51.28
No 58.61 53.79 57.68 43.92
Receiving pension Yes 56.03 51.65 73.8 62.11
No 62.51 53.77 61.27 42.32
Rural settlement Yes 66.07 59.69 73.34 59.09
No 60.09 51.2 58.7 39.81
Moscow or St. Petersburg Yes 50.31 41.11 47.3 35.32
No 62.97 55.33 64.44 46.47
Unemployment experience Yes 66.99 53.62 65.30 45.47
No .63.63 52.92 63.25 42.67
Unemployed in previous year Yes 69.10. 52.65 64.14. 41.48
No .63.62 .53.56 63.31 45.22
The level of regional
unemployment
u<p25* 58.71 47.67 58.44 38.83
p25<u<p50 58.71 55.54 60.51 45.2
p50<u<p75 61.28 55.64 63.75 50.12
p75<u 69.22 56.71 68.86 47.5
The level of specific
unemployment
su<p25 64.24 50.38 68.12 42.42
p25<su<p50 60.28 52.66 62.28 44.24
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Table 2 Percentages of workers who fear of losing their jobs and not finding a new one
(percentage of workers choosing values “4” or “5” when answering the fear questions),
by subgroups of workers, RLMS, 1994-1998 and 2000-2009 (Continued)
p50<su<p75 59.07 55.09 60.49 46.14
su>p75 63.54 54.99 61.17 46.37
The level of specific
non-employment
sne<p25 61.76 52.83 63 44.93
p25<sne<p50 64.16 54.99 64.05 46.21
p50<sne<p75 59.47 53.25 58.15 42.95
sne>p75 62.23 53.2 65.93 46.06
*p25, p50, p75 are values for the 25%, 50%, and 75% percentiles of the regional unemployment distribution, respectively.
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suggest that less competitive and more risk-averse workers are more likely to end up in
better-protected jobs.19 Individuals with a particular set of observable and non-
observable characteristics tend to be concentrated in particular types of jobs. Driven by
their preferences, workers may accept lower wages, thus providing arguments for the
theory of compensating differentials. In our case, fear of job loss can motivate workers
to minimize labor market risks and therefore to encourage them to search for more se-
cure jobs (in the public sector, large firms, and with formal contracts). This kind of
sorting reduces the aggregate fear level, which could otherwise be higher (if workers
were randomly assigned accross protected and unprotected positions). As our previous
research shows, public sector jobs and better protected jobs in Russia are associated
with lower earnings.204.3. Labor market characteristics
Since unemployment and non-employment are continuous variables, we divide their
distributions into quartiles (p25, p50, p75). These quartiles are associated with different
situations that can be called low, medium, and high unemployment (Table 3). Though
rising unemployment and non-employment tend to drive fears up, the associated
increase in fears is not proportional to unemployment growth. For example, shifts from
the low value of group-specific unemployment to the high value in the first sub-period
was accompanied by weakening fears (potentially due to some social learning) and by
strengthening fears by 5 pp in the second sub-period. Unconditional effects of group-
specific unemployment rates do not emerge as strong either.5. Determinants of fear
So far we have presented unconditional averages for fears by social and demographic
groups of workers. In this paragraph we present econometric estimates of effects of un-
employment conditional on other factors. We estimate Eq (1) separately for FEAR_1
and FEAR_2 and for two sub-periods, of which one is for the deep economic decline
(1994-1998) while the other is for remarkable growth (2000-2008). For each of the two
dependent variables we use three specifications, differing in the way the local labor
market situation is described. This description is presented consequently by regional
unemployment rates, group-specific unemployment, and non-employment.
Table 3 Percentiles of the distributions of regional unemployment, specific
unemployment and non-employment












*p25, p50, p75 are values for the 25%, 50%, and 75% percentiles of the regional unemployment distribution, respectively.
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Table 4 presents estimations of the Eq1 with FEAR_1 as the dependent variable. We
estimate it for the both sub-periods pooling the data within each sub-period.21 There is
a strong gender gap in the first sub-period: women seemed to have much stronger fear
than men did. In the second sub-period, the gap tended to shrink but remained statisti-
cally significant. The inverse U-type relationship revealed by the descriptive analysis is
confirmed for the both sub-periods. While in 1994-98 tertiary education reduced job
loss related fears, in the 2000s this factor lost its significance, probably due to a large
increase in the supply of skilled labor and growing over-education. Having a pension as
an alternative income weakened the fear as expected. The same was true for workers
who were married. The positive association with tenure (this fact is also mentioned by
Linz and Semykina 2008) goes against what is usually seen in other countries, but
corresponds with other studies on Russia. This can be explained by the fact that small
investments in firm-specific capital (which is characteristic for Russia) and limited
employment opportunities undermine worker’s bargaining power at the current job. In
the second sub-period, this effect became even stronger.
In 1994-98, employment in state-owned firms was not associated with fear of job
loss, but the expected negative relationship emerged later. During the later period, the
proportion of state-owned sector employment reduced, while the EPL enforcement in
this sector became stronger. Workers more predisposed to stronger anxiety can self-
select the public sector, bringing some endogeneity into the ownership variable. If this
were not true, the negative relationship could be even stronger.
Workers employed by large firms tend to fear unemployment more than those
employed by small or medium-sized firms. This result holds when we exclude the
ownership dummy variable. Again, one could expect to see the contrary, since jobs at
large firms are usually better protected. However, they tend to pay higher wages making
job loss more painful. In addition, large firms in Russia that are traditionally known for
labor hoarding downsized more quickly, thus putting more psychological pressure on
their workers. Here again we may see a non-random selection of low-competitive
workers with stronger fears of job loss (and therefore a preference for more job
security) to larger firms.
Table 4 Factors influencing the fear of losing a job, RLMS, 1994-2009, oprobit
Dependent variable: fear of
losing a job (1-min., 5-max)
1994-1998 2000-2009
RU SU SNE RU SU SNE
Female -0.291*** -0.295*** -0.320*** 0.155*** 0.154*** 0.100***
(0.032) (0.033) (0.070) (0.025) (0.026) (0.031)
Age (years) 0.072*** 0.069*** 0.072*** 0.048*** 0.047*** 0.048***
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Age squared -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Receiving pension -0.107** -0.098* -0.108** -0.089*** -0.092*** -0.086**




-0.101** -0.064 -0.100** -0.041 -0.040 -0.043
(0.048) (0.048) (0.048) (0.030) (0.031) (0.030)
Vocational 0.007 0.057 0.033 -0.028 -0.036 -0.150***
(0.041) (0.045) (0.061) (0.029) (0.030) (0.047)
Tertiary -0.116** -0.063 -0.023 -0.043 -0.068* -0.329***
(0.046) (0.052) (0.197) (0.035) (0.041) (0.110)
Tenure (years) 0.006** 0.005* 0.006** 0.009*** 0.010*** 0.010***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Tenure squared -0.000* -0.000 -0.000* -0.000* -0.000** -0.000**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Married -0.051 -0.051 -0.051 -0.031* -0.026 -0.030*
(0.044) (0.045) (0.044) (0.018) (0.019) (0.018)
Firm size: < 50 employees
(reference category:
>1000 employees)
-0.070 -0.068 -0.071* -0.017 -0.019 -0.017
(0.043) (0.042) (0.042) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022)
51-100 employees -0.114** -0.123*** -0.115** 0.007 -0.002 0.005
(0.047) (0.047) (0.046) (0.026) (0.025) (0.025)
101-200 employees -0.021 -0.039 -0.019 0.075*** 0.070*** 0.072***
(0.056) (0.057) (0.055) (0.024) (0.023) (0.024)
201-1000 employees -0.046 -0.052 -0.045 0.089*** 0.080*** 0.089***
(0.039) (0.038) (0.039) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023)
State ownership 0.013 0.020 0.012 -0.066** -0.063** -0.064**
(0.033) (0.034) (0.033) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027)
Having subordinates -0.079*** -0.070*** -0.078*** -0.059*** -0.060*** -0.060***
(0.028) (0.026) (0.028) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017)
Second job -0.363*** -0.368*** -0.363*** -0.283*** -0.291*** -0.284***
(0.050) (0.051) (0.050) (0.033) (0.034) (0.034)
Rural 0.140* 0.125 0.121 0.232*** 0.226*** 0.251***
(0.072) (0.081) (0.083) (0.054) (0.054) (0.055)
Moscow or St. Petersburg -0.156 -0.149 -0.129 -0.181* -0.235** -0.273***
(0.096) (0.092) (0.083) (0.107) (0.093) (0.089)
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Table 4 Factors influencing the fear of losing a job, RLMS, 1994-2009, oprobit (Continued)
Wage arrears -0.070** -0.071** -0.066** -0.012 -0.012 -0.007
(0.032) (0.031) (0.031) (0.028) (0.030) (0.029)
Regional unemployment (%) -0.015 0.017
(0.022) (0.012)
Specific unemployment (%) -0.004 0.002
(0.005) (0.002)
Specific unemployment (%) -0.002 0.005***
(0.004) (0.002)
N 11 451 11 075 11 451 48 807 47 068 48 807
Notes: 1) Standard errors robust to heteroscedasticity, autocorrelation and clusterisation are in parentheses;
2) *** - significance at 1% level; ** - significance at 5% level; *- significance at 10% level; 3) Controls: occupations, federal
districts and years; 4) Estimates for constants and cut points are available on request: 5) RU is regional unemployment,
SU is specific unemployment, SNE is specific non-employment.
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having informal agreements only. This outcome is robust on all available cross-
sections (1998, 2000, 2002-2008) and is reproduced if the relevant dummy is added to
the complete specification on the 2002-2008 pool. This is even stronger evidence on
self-selection than those mentioned earlier.22
Fear of job loss is expectedly stronger among rural residents than among urban resi-
dents, and in largest cities it is the weakest. This is explained by the simple fact that
the fear of job loss weakens as job opportunities expand. Being a supervisor for other
workers, as a rule, adds power and reflects a relative value of such worker for a firm.
Wage arrears were associated with stronger fears in the first sub-period as an indirect
indication of bad financial situation at his/her firm as well as his/her relative value for
employer. However, the sharply decreased incidence of wage arrears in the second
sub-period made this factor statistically insignificant.
How did local labor markets affect feelings of fear? Do signals sent by actual
unemployment to workers strengthen or weaken subjective insecurity? As we show
further, these signals if accepted by workers turn out to be of weak influence.
As already noted, we use three different indicators of local labor market conditions:
regional unemployment rate (RU), group-specific unemployment rate (SU), and
group-specific non-employment rate (SNE). In the first sub-period, coefficients for all
of these indicators were negative and of no significance. In the second sub-period, all
coefficients become positive, but only the coefficient for group-specific non-employ-
ment achieves significance.23 Does higher unemployment transpire into stronger
perceptions of insecurity? In order to answer this question, getting just statistical sig-
nificance is not enough and we are interested in practical significance as well.
The associations between fear of unemployment and personal experience of
unemployment (given that all other variables are controlled for) are presented in
Table 5. We present them in a separate table since inclusion of the variables for
personal experience significantly reduces the sample. The association is insignificant
regardless of which indicator of previous experience is used. This finding is repro-
duced in all specifications, including annual cross-sections. Meanwhile, statistical
significance for various unemployment variables is not changed (see Section 6).
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The estimates from Eq. (1) for the alternative variable of fear (fear of not finding a new
job or FEAR_2) largely reproduce the results presented above (Table 6), though with
some nuances.
Women are more likely than men to fear not finding a new job. The age effect in the
second sub-period disappears, and marital status has no effect in the either period.
Place of residence matters: urban residents fear job finding difficulties less than rural
residents do, and residents of Moscow and Saint Petersburg fear not finding a new job
even less. In the first sub-period, tertiary education only affected fear negatively and
this effect did not hold when variables for group-specific unemployment or non-
employment were included. In the second sub-period, workers with primary vocational
education were least afraid of not finding reemployment, while those without general
secondary were most afraid. The latter group differs significantly from all others.
Getting a pension or secondary job provide additional «secured» income that decreases
job search costs. In the first period, personal exposure to wage arrears was among the
determinants of fear, but this effect disappeared in the second sub-period.
Effect of job characteristics of jobs on fear is ambiguous. Workers in small firms fear
less and probably are used to more frequent mobility and job change. Working for state
owned firms does not matter.
Now let us turn to the labor market indicators. In the first sub-period, they were sta-
tistically insignificant, but later they became significant with the expected sign.
However, only two of three specifications (with regional unemployment and group-
specific non-employment) remained significant cluster robust with clustering on
individuals.
Being unemployed in the past strengthens fears of not finding a new job significantly,
other things equal (see Table 7). Those who have already faced reemployment after
being unemployed are likely to better understand the associated costs. Using the
alternative variable that reflects unemployment status one year before the survey period
confirms this association (between the UN experience and FEAR_2).Table 5 Personal unemployment experience and fear of losing a job, RLMS, 1994-2008,
oprobit
Dependent variable: fear of
losing a job (1-min., 5-max)
1994-1998 2000-2008
RU SU SNE RU SU SNE
Regional unemployment (%) -0.010 0.018
(0.006) (0.012)
Specific unemployment (%) -0.003 0.001
(0.005) (0.002)




0.115 0.154* 0.113 0.007 0.011 0.009
(0.073) (0.081) (0.080) (0.034) (0.033) (0.033)
Notes: 1) Standard errors robust to heteroscedasticity, autocorrelation and clusterisation are in parentheses;
2) *** - significance at 1% level; ** - significance at 5% level; *- significance at 10% level; 3) All variables mentioned in
Table 4 are controlled; 4) Estimates for constants and cut points are available on request; 5) RU is regional
unemployment, SU is specific unemployment, SNE is specific non-employment.
Table 6 Factors influencing the fear of not finding a new job, RLMS, 1994-2009, oprobit
Dependent variable: fear of
not finding a new job (1-min., 5-max)
1994-1998 2000-2009
Variables RU SU SNE RU SU SNE
Female -0.542*** -0.540*** -0.535*** 0.283*** 0.284*** 0.231***
(0.032) (0.033) (0.060) (0.034) (0.033) (0.036)
Age (years) 0.020** 0.020** 0.020** 0.001 0.002 0.001
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Age squared -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Receiving pension 0.050 0.043 0.047 0.033 0.039 0.036
(0.062) (0.064) (0.063) (0.036) (0.034) (0.036)
Education level: secondary
(reference category: below secondary)
0.016 0.023 0.019 -0.066* -0.056 -0.066*
(0.041) (0.042) (0.043) (0.036) (0.035) (0.036)
Vocational 0.010 0.017 0.009 -0.101*** -0.101*** -0.215***
(0.042) (0.040) (0.061) (0.029) (0.030) (0.051)
Tertiary -0.092** -0.079* -0.105 -0.072** -0.082** -0.339***
(0.046) (0.042) (0.164) (0.031) (0.037) (0.106)
Tenure (years) 0.010*** 0.009*** 0.010*** 0.023*** 0.024*** 0.024***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Tenure squared -0.000* -0.000* -0.000* -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Married 0.004 0.002 0.005 -0.008 -0.010 -0.007
(0.039) (0.039) (0.039) (0.022) (0.023) (0.022)
Firm size: < 50 employees
(reference category: >1000 employees)
-0.153*** -0.152*** -0.153*** -0.059* -0.057* -0.058*
(0.053) (0.053) (0.053) (0.031) (0.031) (0.031)
51-100 employees -0.204*** -0.195*** -0.201*** 0.033 0.024 0.030
(0.054) (0.053) (0.055) (0.038) (0.037) (0.037)
101-200 employees -0.083 -0.085 -0.084 0.085*** 0.079*** 0.082***
(0.059) (0.059) (0.060) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027)
201-1000 employees -0.056 -0.058 -0.056 0.101*** 0.098*** 0.100***
(0.044) (0.042) (0.044) (0.028) (0.029) (0.028)
State ownership 0.033 0.033 0.032 -0.053** -0.051** -0.051**
(0.029) (0.030) (0.029) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024)
Having subordinates -0.108*** -0.100*** -0.108*** -0.115*** -0.119*** -0.117***
(0.036) (0.035) (0.036) (0.016) (0.016) (0.015)
Second job -0.428*** -0.437*** -0.430*** -0.433*** -0.425*** -0.434***
(0.047) (0.047) (0.047) (0.041) (0.042) (0.042)
Rural 0.346*** 0.347*** 0.352*** 0.511*** 0.498*** 0.525***
(0.070) (0.072) (0.071) (0.097) (0.100) (0.097)
Moscow or St. Petersburg -0.236** -0.247** -0.245** -0.008 -0.095 -0.126
(0.100) (0.102) (0.099) (0.103) (0.082) (0.077)
Wage arrears 0.133*** 0.139*** 0.136*** -0.002 0.003 0.005
(0.026) (0.027) (0.027) (0.031) (0.032) (0.031)
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Table 6 Factors influencing the fear of not finding a new job, RLMS, 1994-2009, oprobit
(Continued)
Regional unemployment (%) 0.007 0.022**
(0.016) (0.011)
Specific unemployment (%) -0.000 0.002
(0.003) (0.002)
Specific unemployment (%) 0.000 0.005***
(0.004) (0.002)
N 11 369 10 998 11 332 48 187 46 463 48 187
Notes: 1) Standard errors robust to heteroscedasticity, autocorrelation and clusterisation are in parentheses;
2) *** - significance at 1% level; ** - significance at 5% level; *- significance at 10% level; 3) Controls: occupations, federal
districts and years; 4) Estimates for constants and cut points are available on request; 5) RU is regional unemployment,
SU is specific unemployment, SNE is specific non-employment.
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We also test alternative specifications, excluding all those variables that are potentially
endogenous. Though our unemployment variables are exogenous and are not associated
with individual and job characteristics, their coefficients estimates can be potentially
contaminated by endogeneity of characteristics as firm size, type of labor contract, job ten-
ure, exposure to wage arrears, among others. Estimation of this reduced specification gives
basically unchanged results for unemployment coefficients (in order to save space here,
we do not present these estimates, but they are available upon request).
As an alternative robustness check, we estimated our regressions separately for
groups of workers with different employment protections. One could expect that
unemployment would have a smaller effect on fears if jobs are well protected. In order
to differentiate workers by job security, we used two major criteria, ownership (state vs.
private) and firm size (fewer than 50 workers vs. over 500 workers), and their inter-
action. We assume that employment protection in small private firms is weaker than in
large state-owned companies. (However, if we assume that large firms offer better
employee-employer match, then the impact of firm size on fear can be positive). We find
that the impact of unemployment on fears remains insignificant in all sub-samples (theTable 7 Personal unemployment experience and fear of not finding a new job, RLMS,
1994-2008, oprobit
Dependent variable: fear of not
finding a new job
1994-1998 2000-2008
(1-min., 5-max.) RU SU SNE RU SU SNE
Regional unemployment (%) 0.011 0.023**
0.018 0.011
Specific unemployment (%) 0.001 0.002
0.003 0.002




0.154** 0.169** 0.150** 0.074*** 0.084*** 0.078***
0.072 0.077 0.072 0.023 0.025 0.024
Notes: 1) Standard errors robust to heteroscedasticity, autocorrelation and clusterisation are in parentheses;
2) *** - significance at 1% level; ** - significance at 5% level; *- significance at 10% level; 3) All variables mentioned in
Table 4 are controlled; 4) Estimates for constants and cut points are available on request; 5) RU is regional
unemployment, SU is specific unemployment, SNE is specific non-employment.
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fearfulness causes implicit sorting of workers across protected and non-protected jobs.
The fact that estimates are stable over time also point to their robustness. Since we
consider the long period (1994-2009) that includes different sub-periods with contrast-
ing macroeconomic regimes, the impact of actual unemployment could vary over time.
Though coefficients are insignificant on the pooled sample, they may be significant for
particular years. We show the corresponding estimates in Table 8. For convenience of
comparison, we also present the estimates for both pooled sub-periods. In any year of
the first sub-period, the effect of unemployment on either fear was insignificant and
close to the estimate on the pooled sample. In the second sub-period, the impact of
regional unemployment on fear of losing job was insignificant in 7 cases of 10, the
impact of group-specific unemployment was insignificant in 9 cases of 10, and the
impact of group-specific non-employment was insignificant in 6 cases of 10. The same
outcomes were observed for fear of not finding a job. These results indicate that our
estimates based on the pooled data reflect inter-temporal story quite correctly.
5.4. Dynamics of fears
Our equations include another important parameter that consistently retains a high value
in all specifications. This is the time effect (year of the survey). Being purged of the
influence of individual characteristics, characteristics of jobs and unemployment rates, it
can be interpreted as reflecting the influence of the social atmosphere in the society in the
given year. If comparing actual unemployment with a thunderstorm (the latter can
be stronger or weaker), then the time effect can be compared with expectation of aTable 8 Effects of unemployment on the fear of losing a job and on the fear of not
finding a new job, by yearly cross-sections, RLMS, 1994-2009
Fear of losing a job Fear of not finding a new job
RU SU SNE RU SU SNE
1994 -0.031 -0.009 -0.004 1994 0.003 -0.004 0.006
1995 0.004 0.003 -0.001 1995 0.039 0.007 -0.003
1996 -0.024 -0.004 0.001 1996 0.008 -0.001 -0.003
1998 -0.003 -0.003 -0.002 1998 0.015 -0.001 0.004
1994-1998 -0.015 -0.004 -0.002 1994-1998 0.007 0.000 0.000
2000 -0.023 -0.002 0.006 2000 -0.010 -0.006 0.002
2001 0.010 -0.005 -0.002 2001 0.043** -0.002 0.001
2002 0.039 0.007 0.009** 2002 0.028 -0.000 0.004
2003 0.040* 0.010* 0.015*** 2003 0.025 0.011** 0.012***
2004 0.019 0.003 0.014*** 2004 0.019 0.002 0.006
2005 0.030* 0.002 0.007* 2005 0.035** 0.004 0.007**
2006 0.033* 0.004 0.002 2006 0.044*** 0.005 0.003
2007 0.012 0.005 0.004 2007 0.019 0.007 0.010***
2008 0.004 -0.003 0.003 2008 0.043** 0.000 0.011***
2009 -0.001 -0.002 -0.002 2009 0.008 -0.002 0.002
2000-2009 0.017 0.002 0.005*** 2000-2009 0.022** 0.002 0.005***
Notes: *** - significance at 1% level; ** - significance at 5% level; *- significance at 10% level. RU is regional
unemployment, SU is specific unemployment, SNE is specific non-employment.
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erroneous information based on prejudices. Meanwhile, these erroneous visions can
be deliberately disseminated, or they can evolve spontaneously. In this sense, the time
effect in our setting is a measure of social stability in the society in the given year as
an expectation of an unemployment “thunderstorm” that may never occur.
Figure 4 presents yearly changes in unconditional averages for fear (dotted lines) as
well as conditional time effects (continuous lines) over the whole period of 1994-2008.
In 1994-2001, the latter were slightly below the unconditional averages, but they
switched places in 2005-08. In the beginning of the period, the unconditional averages
overestimated the effect of time on fears, but underestimated the effect later on.
Fears reached peak levels in the crisis-ridden year of 1998, then weakened by 2001
and stayed at the same levels since then. In 2002, the new Labor Code did not cause
any change in fear levels. From 2001 to 2007, fear of losing job stayed almost intact
with insignificant fluctuations. Fears associated with job search changed little in
2001-05 but weakened further in 2006-07. A change in the trend happened in 2008
against the background of the economic crisis. Estimates for time effects as proxies for
social stability increased dramatically, signaling that the population expected a strong
“thunderstorm”. Note that this was an expectation only, since the “thunderstorm”
itself (as a catastrophic level of unemployment) passed by and touched the population
only marginally and somewhat later. The RLMS data were collected largely in October
and November, while a major increase in unemployment was captured by statistics
only in early 2009. In November 2008, the unemployment rate equaled a modest 7%,
the level of 2004-05. These years were considered quite successful from the labor mar-
ket point of view. Such impulsive and early reactions of fear to unemployment which
had not occurred yet indicates that Russian people have low trust in social protection


























fear not to find a new job (uncond.) fear not to find a new job(cond.)
fear to lose a job (uncond.) fear to lose a job(cond.)
Figure 4 Unconditional and conditional dynamics of workers perceptions of job security,
1994-2009.
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The data presented above allows us to conclude that actual unemployment does not
unambiguously emerge as a strong factor generating fear of unemployment, though in
a few specifications its effect is statistically significant. Given specific features of the
ordered probit model, we cannot interpret the coefficients as explicit elasticities. In
order to get some sense of practical effect of unemployment on fear, we calculate
conditional probabilities of choosing various positions on the fear scales. We let
unemployment vary while keeping all other right hand variables equal to sample
means.
Since between-group and over-time variation in choosing the position 4 is quite
small, we focus on choosing the position 5 which is more sensitive to changes in exter-
nal factors. Estimated differences in average conditional probabilities for choosing pos.
5 for all unemployment variables, given that individual and job characteristics are con-
trolled for, are presented on Figure 5-6. Let us assume that the unemployment level
changed instantly from its rate that was equal to the 25th percentile in the distribution
to the rate of the 75th percentile, given that all other characteristics are fixed. This
would be a very large and shocking change in the labor market. In the first sub-period,
this simulated jump would transfer our respondents from a labor market with specific
unemployment of 6,6% into the market with 14,1% of unemployment. However, the
probability of entering the group with the maximal level of fear would hardly change
(see Figure 5). In other words, the reaction to change in external environment would
be very weak (but negative!). One could speculate that in the 1990s, the Russians faced
the unemployment problem for the first time in their personal life and had little expe-
rience in dealing with it. The increase in unemployment in that period was accompan-
ied for the population with intensive social learning that led to forming more rational
perceptions.
In the second sub-period, the effect of unemployment on the fear of job loss became
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Figure 5 Effects of different factors on the probability to choose value “5” (very concerned) when
answering the question on the fear of losing a job.
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Figure 6 Effects of different factors on the probability to choose value “5” (very concerned) when
answering the question on the fear of not finding a new job.
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probability for fear of losing job by a hardly visible 0,08 pp.
How did the fear of not finding a job react? This reaction would also be very subtle.
In the first sub-period, an increase in regional unemployment from 7,9 to 11,5% would
increase conditional probability of the maximal level of fear from 36,6% to 37,5%, or
less than by 1 pp. However, a change in the specific unemployment from 6,6% to 14,1%
would cause no effect on the level of fear. An increase in the specific non-employment
from 24,9 to 68,4% would increase probability of the fear by 0,5 pp. In the second
sub-period, the reaction of interest remained weak. Thus, doubling the regional
unemployment was associated with an increase in the probability of fear of not finding
a job by 2,7 pp (from 19,2 to 21,9%). The response from the specific unemployment
was much weaker: a jump in unemployment from 4,3% to 13,2% caused an increase in
the probability by just 0,5 pp. However, tripling the specific non-employment rate (from
26,9% to 75,7%) increased this probability by 6,8 pp. Note that all these simulated
changes in labor market conditions are dramatic and unrealistically large in their
magnitude. This serves as an additional illustration for the fact that expected reactions
of unemployment on fears remain weak in practical terms, even if they are statistically
significant.24
7. Conclusions
Using Russian household survey data (RLMS) for 1994-2009, we detect that the
Russians tend to have very articulated fears of losing their jobs and not finding new
ones of comparable worth. Our comparisons show that such fear indexes are much
higher than in the OECD countries and are close to that is observed in Latin American
countries with weak social protection systems. This indicates that Russian workers
perceive the actual state of job security as weak.
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ristics of workers, ii) job-related characteristics, and iii) labor market characteristics.
Better-educated workers, younger workers, men, and urban workers feel better
protected, other things being equal. Having an alternative income source in a form of
pension or second job serves as an additional protection. These effects do not come as a
surprise. The effects of job characteristics seem to be less obvious. Working at a small
or medium-sized firm weakens fears, though employment in small firms is usually more
flexible and less protected. The effect of state ownership is ambiguous, but it is small
even if it is protective. We cannot exclude the possibility that more fearful workers
preselect themselves into better-protected jobs. If sorting of this type actually takes
place, the observed level of fear is lower than it otherwise could be. We also confirm the
findings which were noted earlier in other papers on Russia and which diverge from the
findings on other countries (that women tend to express stronger fears and that the
fearfulness increases with tenure).
Our main finding is that the fear of unemployment on the Russian labor market is
only loosely associated with actual unemployment. One could expect that subjective
perceptions should reflect fluctuations of unemployment rates. In fact, they are usually
closely associated in the OECD countries, but in Russia this association is not strong if
exists at all. Having estimated various specifications for different sub-periods and on
various subsamples, we have not found statistically strong association between indivi-
dual fears of unemployment and actual local unemployment, including that among
peers. Even if coefficients for unemployment (as they are in some specifications) are
statistically significant, its practical impact remains small. The simulation of contrast
changes in unemployment rates does not induce significant changes in the fears.
Very high and persistent level of fear of unemployment against the background of
rapid economic growth and fast labor market recovery raises the issue of what causes
fearfulness in Russia. We may speculatively suggest two potential (and not mutually
exclusive) fruitful directions for such study.
The first direction is motivated by the recent paper on the geography of fear (Treisman,
2011). Treisman argues that partial fears are inter-correlated and some countries are more
fearful than others, while the actual risks that population is facing often do not emerge as
a cause of the fearfulness. Russia is not included in the Treisman’s sample but high inten-
sity and persistence of fears can be explained through strong predisposition to fears.
The second direction is related to the stream of literature arguing that personal
experience in the past may affect future behavior and subjective perceptions (e.g., Giuliano
and Spilimbergo, 2009; Malmendier and Nagel, 2011). The Russian population expe-
rienced very strong shocks in the late 1980s and early 1990s that might leave deep mental
scars supporting their fear of unemployment.
In the meantime, high and persistent fears may have important politico-economic
implications. Given the strong fear of unemployment in the population, any economic
reform that affects allocation of labor may face additional resistance. Politicians reac-
ting to subjective perceptions of voters are likely to freeze reforms if the latter are likely
to cause more labor market volatility. Therefore, the workers’ fear of unemployment
becomes the politicians’ fear and may stimulate the government to populist political
actions. This, in turn, threatens to further reduce the number of protected jobs, thus
causing even stronger fear.
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1Al Gore. The Politics of Fear. Social Research Vol 71: No 4, Winter 2004, p. 788.
2Scared people are more likely to abandon human rights and democracy while
authoritarian-style politicians are eager to use this. But even in stable democracies,
fears can easily be politically used and misused. An example of such use of fear is the
fight against terrorism in the USA after 9/11. (See more in: Fear: Its Political Uses and
Abuses, Social Research, 2004). In Russia, we observed the same sort of political use
and misuse in Russia after the terrorist attacks in Moscow or Beslan when Russians
easily gave up their civil rights and freedoms.
3For example, the Russian government, being afraid of social protests and of losing
popularity as a consequence of mass displacements, was ready to bail out potentially
bankrupt firms. In September 2009, the largest Russian carmaker AVTOVAZ
announced forthcoming mass layoffs (staff cuts by 30%). The government intervened
immediately to ban these plans, since it was afraid of the social and political conse-
quences [Vedomosti, 9.10.09]. As a result, the firm received a massive financial bailout.
4This indicator jumped up to 28% in 2009.
5As a note, the authors have never shared this opinion. See Gimpelson et al. (2010b).
6There is no consensus in the literature whether the Russian EPL can be considered
rigid. According to OECD (2011) and Muravyev (2010), Russia’s EPL is not stringent
compared to the OECD average. Kapeliushnikov (2011) evaluates it as much more
stringent that the OECD average. However, all seem to agree that the regulation of
permanent contracts is excessively stringent. The disagreement concerns the evaluation
of stringency in relation to fixed-term contracts and temporary work agencies (for
more details see Kapeliushnikov, 2011). The authors of this paper share the opinion
that actual rules are excessively rigid given formal legal regulations as well as judicial
practice and extralegal governmental interventions.
7On EPL enforcement in Russia see: Gimpelson et al. (2010).
8Unemployment benefits were raised notably in the beginning of 2009 as an anti-
crisis measure.
9Each of the fear questions allows for five alternative responces ranked from 1 (the
lowest level of fear) to 5 (the highest level). For more details about the RLMS and
variables used in this study see Section 3.
10This goes in line with the cross-country studies showing a negative relationship
between EPL strictness and subjective perceptions of job security (see, for example,
Clark and Postel-Vinay 2009).
11This situation is somewhat similar to the relationship between the level of trust in
the society and demand for the state regulation which are also positively associated (see
Aghion, Ph., Y.Algann, P.Cahuc and Shleifer 2009).
12These can be various time-related events like legislative amendments that may
change the general regulatory framework, or increased public awareness disseminated
by media.
13Initially the second question scale was designed in the opposite way. For conve-
nience, we converted it to make higher scores mean stronger fear.
14Gimpelson et al. (2003) used the index that was equaled to the sum of both
variables. Linz and Semykina (2008) used these questions separately.
15We are grateful to the anonymous referee, who emphasized this issue.
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the US Presidents. They argue that respondents pay attention to the unemployment in
their peer groups as well as unemployment at the national level.
17We have to admit that the RLMS data does not capture periods between survey
rounds and therefore does not allow reconstructing a worker’s complete history. This
can lead to underestimation of actual unemployment experience.
18We cannot exclude endogeneity of some individual and job characteristics to the
fear of unemployment. It can be caused by unobservables affecting observable charac-
teristics in the Eq. (1) as well as the fear variables. Another reason is in potential
sorting of workers, in which those workers who are more fearful will seek more
protected jobs. However, neither reason may affect estimates of coefficients for actual
aggregate unemployment.
19About labor market sorting see, for example, Krueger and Schkade (2008).
20Gimpelson and Monusova (2009).
21Methodologically, this process is very close to what was done by Linz and Semykina
(2008) on the RLMS data. At this stage, the distinction of our work is that it uses
additional variables and longer period of time. Our estimates for specifications similar
to those used by Linz and Semykina (2008) are almost identical.
22We do not present tables with these findings for the sake of saving space. The
informal sector dummies are available for selected years only.
23The changing direction of influence coincides with findings from other studies, e.g.
Gimpelson et al. (2003) and Linz and Semykina (2008). This can be interpreted as an
outcome of intensive social learning that took place during the period.
24In Linz and Semykina (2008, p. 452), a twofold increase in regional unemployment
(from 6% to 12%) the conditional probability of choosing high fear scores (4+5) rose by
2 pp (from 0,60 to 0,62) only in 1995-98, by 5 pp (from 0,55 to 0,60) in 2000-04.
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